Abstract: This paper reviews and discusses available empirical research on the impact of violent conflict on the level and access to education of civilian and combatant populations affected by violence. Three main themes emerge from this empirical review. The first is that relatively minor shocks to educational access can lead to significant and long-lasting detrimental effects on individual human capital formation in terms of educational attainment, health outcomes and labour market opportunities. Secondly, the destruction of infrastructure, the absence of teachers and reductions in schooling capacity affect secondary schooling disproportionately. Finally, the exposure of households to violence results in significant gender differentials in individual educational outcomes. The paper then turns its attention to the specific mechanisms that link violent conflict with educational outcomes, an area largely unexplored in the literatures on conflict and education. The paper focuses six key mechanisms: soldiering, household labour allocation decisions, fear, changes in returns to education, targeting of schools, teachers and students and displacement.
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Introduction
Violent conflict is one of the most important development challenges facing the world today.
Although the incidence of civil wars has decreased in recent years (Harbom and Wallensteen 2009) , the legacy of violence persists across many countries around the world, especially in Africa, Caucasia, the Balkans, and the Middle East. The economic, political and social consequences of civil wars are immense. War displaces people, destroys capital and infrastructure, disrupts schooling, damages the social fabric, endangers civil liberties, and creates health and famine crises.
Almost 750,000 people die as a result of armed conflict each year (Geneva Declaration Secretariat 2008) , and more than 20 million people were internally displaced by civil wars at the end of 2007 (UNHCR 2008) . Any of these effects will have considerable consequences for long-term development outcomes. Yet while there is a growing consensus that development interventions and the promotion of democracy worldwide cannot be disassociated from the restrictions caused by violent conflict, we have limited rigorous evidence on how violent conflict affects development outcomes, the economy or the lives of people exposed to violence.
One fundamental mechanism by which violent conflict may affect log-term development outcomes is through the accumulation of human capital, a central mechanism in economic growth and development processes (Galor and Weil 2000 , Lucas 1988 , Schultz 1961 . The objective of this paper is to review the available evidence on one important micro-level mechanism linking civil wars and long-term development outcomes, namely the level and access to education of civilian and combatant populations affected by violence. The paper is particularly concerned with the long-term human capital consequences of lost education.
Violent conflict and human capital accumulation: theoretical considerations
From a theoretical point of view, the long-term developmental effects of violent conflict are unclear. Neoclassical models predict rapid catch-up growth in the post-conflict period as the economy converges to its steady state growth rate. In particular, the temporary destruction of capital can be overcome in the long-term by higher investments in affected areas that will bring the overall economy to its steady growth path (see discussion in Miguel 2010 and Bellows and Miguel 2006) . Davis and Weinstein (2002) , employing a unique dataset on Japanese regional population, look at the effects of the Allied bombing of Japanese cities during World War II. Their findings reveal that cities that suffered the largest population declines due to the bombing tended to have the fastest post-war growth rates. The typical city in Japan affected by the bombings recovered 2 its former relative size fully within 15 years following the end of World War II. Brakman, Garrtesen and Shramm (2004) arrive at similar conclusions in their analysis of the impact of the bombing of German cities during WWII on post war German city growth. Miguel and Roland (2006) Cerra and Saxena 2008 , Organski and Kugler 1977 1980 , Przeworski et al. 2000 . Civil wars may also promote state formation and nation building as was the case in Europe (Tilly 1978 (Tilly 1990 , and may induce social progress via greater popular participation in civic and political institutions (Blattman 2008 , Bellows and Miguel 2006 , Wood 2003 .
Other studies point to the long-term destructive effects of civil wars that may remain entrenched in certain regions even if economic growth converges at the aggregate level. Civil wars break social cohesion (Collette and Cullen 2000), destroy infrastructure and create political instability and insecurity in property rights (ERD 2009 , OECD 2009 ). The destruction entailed by warfare, combined with the erosion of institutions and organizations, leads to a deterioration of the economic environment. This in turn leads to a reduction in the desired levels of factors of production. Some factors (such as physical and human capital) are more able to leave the country than others (such as arable land), giving rise to a gradual exodus of these more mobile factors (Collier 1999) . Violent conflict may also affect severely the quality and functioning of institutions, the expansion of technology and social outcomes Miguel 2010, Acemoglu and Robinson 2006) . In particular, recent research on the micro-level effects of violent conflict has shown that negative impacts of civil wars on education, labour and health of individuals and households can be observed decades after the conflict (Alderman, Hoddinott and Kinsey 2006 , Bundervoet, Verwimp and Akresh 2009 , Shemyakina, 2006 . Although these effects may average out at the macroeconomic level, they may contribute to the emergence of poverty traps amongst specific population groups affected by violence (Justino 2009 (Justino 2010 .
The impact of war on the accumulation of human capital amongst civilian populations affected by violence can be substantial and persistent. Not only do people living in war zones suffer injuries, 3 death and have their property destroyed, they may also be displaced from their homes and lose their means of survival. Children are especially adversely affected by the destruction of physical capital and the deterioration of economic conditions given the age-specific aspects of many human capital investments. Civil wars and associated physical destruction can interrupt the education of children through the damage to schools, absence of teachers, fears of insecurity and changes in family structures and household income. Children can also be negatively affected by the worsening of their health due to the association of violent conflict with famines, widespread malnutrition, outbreaks of infectious diseases, post-war trauma, and the destruction of health facilities. The destruction of human capital during childhood is a well-documented mechanism leading to poverty traps, given the severe long-run effects it can have on individual and household welfare via the future labor market outcomes and economic performance of affected children (see Mincer 1974 , Shultz 1961 and Becker 1962 .
These micro-level effects of civil wars remain largely under-researched. This is unsurprising given that large-scale, high quality micro-level level data for developing countries affected by civil war is generally not available. When it is available it is difficult to identify whether and under which circumstances household coping behaviour is induced by civil war events or by other economic conditions that may have taken place simultaneously (see discussion in Verwimp, Justino and Brück 2009) . Detailed measures of conflict and associated destruction are often not available, and such information is difficult to collect from countries that have just emerged or are emerging from armed conflict. In the next section, we discuss in more detail the available empirical evidence on the impact of violent conflict on education. Section 3 explores the different mechanisms that may link the outbreak of violent conflict with educational outcomes, an area that has remained unexplored in the literatures on conflict and on education.
Violent conflict and human capital accumulation: the evidence so far
Violent conflict results in deaths, injuries, disability and psychological trauma to men, women and children. These outcomes of violence may often be enough to push previously vulnerable households below critical thresholds. These may become impossible to overcome if the household is unable to replace labour or capital, and may last across generations if the impact on children"s education and health is significant (Case and Paxson 2006, Maccini and Young 2009 ). Below we review emerging empirical literature on the impact of violent conflict on educational outcomes amongst children and young men and women affected by violence. 4 For a long time, research on the consequences of violent conflict focused on estimating the aggregate costs that civil wars impose on countries (e.g. Knight et al. 1996 , Collier 1999 , Stewart and Fitzgerald 2001 . Programmes of conflict resolution have also been typically driven by concerns with state security and state capacity (see UN 2004 UN , 2005 Shemyakina (2006) finds from her empirical work in Tajikistan, that it is girls who suffer the greatest loss in education due to concerns over safety and low returns to girls" education. In contrast, Akresh and de Walque (2008) find that, in Rwanda, it is amongst the male children in nonpoor households that these negative shocks are strongest, potentially due to a levelling off of educational achievements to a low level for everyone. Some consistent patterns have however started to emerge.
The first is that relatively minor shocks to educational access can lead to significant and longlasting detrimental effects on individual human capital formation in terms of educational attainment, health outcomes and labour market opportunities. Akbulut-Yuksel (2009) The second pattern emerging from this area of research is that the destruction of infrastructure, the absence of teachers and reductions in schooling capacity during violent conflicts across the world see to have affected secondary schooling disproportionately. Chen Loayza and Reynal-Querol (2008) find that the average recovery rate for primary-school enrolment in the period between 1960 and 2003 was larger than that of secondary enrolment in post-conflict countries. Stewart et al. (2001) find that primary school enrolments decreased in only three out of eighteen countries in their sample of countries affected by civil wars. These effects recur also in micro-level studies. Akresh and De Walque (2008) examined the impact of Rwanda"s 1994 genocide on children"s schooling.
They find that school age children exposed to the genocide experienced a drop in educational 6 achievement of almost half a year of completed schooling, and are 15% less likely to complete 3 rd or 4 th grade. The most likely mechanism linking the genocide to educational attainment is through lack of progression to higher secondary schooling grades. Swee (2009) provides evidence on the effects of the civil war in Bosnia (1992 Bosnia ( -1995 on schooling attainment of the cohorts who were in the process of completing their primary and secondary schooling during the war. He finds that individuals in cohorts affected by the civil war are less likely to complete secondary schooling if they resided in municipalities which experienced higher levels of war intensity. He finds no noticeable effects on primary schooling, which might indicate successful organisation of war schools at the primary level. Swee argues that youth soldiering may be the key mechanism explaining these effects.
The third pattern is that the exposure of households to violence results in significant gender differentials in individual educational outcomes. Shemyakina (2006) examines the effects of the armed conflict (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) in Tajikistan. Her results indicate that exposure to the conflict had a large, significant and negative effect on the enrolment of girls. She observes little or no effect on the enrolment of boys. Girls who were of school age and during the conflict, and lived in conflictaffected regions, were 12.3% less likely to complete mandatory schooling as compared to girls who completed their schooling before the conflict started. They are also 7% less likely to complete school than girls of the same age who lived in regions relatively unaffected by the civil war.
Furthermore, Shemyakina finds that the probability of completing the mandatory nine grades is 4%
and 7% lower for boys and girls, respectively. The probability decreases by another 5% for girls born between 1978 and 1986 that lived in regions affected by the conflict during their schooling years. These results suggest that households affected by conflict invested more in the schooling of boys, for whom there is less perceived risk of violence, harassment or abduction. Due to the destruction of industries and infrastructure, job opportunities for skilled labour may become scarce, in which case it may make more economic sense to educate boys as they may be more likely than girls to take up higher paid jobs. In a similar paper, Chamarbagwala and Morán (2009) warfare. The effect for males is smaller. Female education continued to lag behind male education throughout the country, but especially so in the areas which of high war intensity between 1979 and 1984, almost two decades after the worst conflict outbreak (in 2002). The study suggests that loss of property and massive displacement led households to reallocate limited resources towards providing young boys and, to a lesser extent, young girls, with at least some primary education. While both boys and girls received less secondary and high school education as a result of the civil war, the effects were more pronounced for girls. As in the Tajikistan study, considerations regarding higher education returns for boys and fear of abduction and rape of girls may explain these results.
Similarly to Akresh and de Walque (2008) , Chamarbagwala and Morán find that a lower probability of progressing from one grade to another rather than not attaining any education appears to drive the results.
Causal mechanisms linking violent conflict and educational outcomes
The literature reviewed above shows a clear negative legacy of violent conflict on the human capital of individuals (and consequently of families) exposed to violence. Amongst the results discussed, a debate has emerged as to what causal mechanisms explain the negative link between violent conflict and educational outcomes. While it is clear that civil wars affect household education attainment and schooling decisions, it is much less apparent through which channels and for how long these effects will impact on the long-term ability of individuals and households to survive economically, access sustainable forms of livelihood, and make long-term production, consumption or labour decisions. More research therefore needs to be done in terms of uncovering the precise mechanisms through which the relationship operates. Detailed knowledge of the mechanisms that support this negative relationship between conflict and educational outcomes are crucial towards creating and implementing effective policy to ensure these negative consequences are dampened.
Civil wars affect negatively educational outcomes because, during violent conflict, children are either removed from school, are prevented from attending school or the conditions under which they attend school do not provide them with education of sufficient quality. Below we discuss several types of mechanisms that explain the absence or reduction in schooling of children affected by fighting. We discuss below six possible mechanisms: soldiering, household labour allocation decisions, fear, changes in returns to education, targeting of schools, teachers and students and displacement. The recruitment of children into armed groups and armies has considerable impacts on their educational attainment, with consequences on their level of human capital. In particular, participation in armed groups affects negatively the long-term economic performance of child soldiers in terms of skills, productivity and earnings because military activities are not good substitutes for the benefits that individuals will acquire through education and work experience (Blattman and Annan 2007) . Boys and girls exposed to conflict may also experience severe psychological effects that may continue long after the war is over and affect their educational outcomes. Weak economic opportunities in turn may serve to exacerbate the conflict if individuals have more to gain from soldiering when peacetime economic opportunities are limited (Grossman 2002 , Walter 2004 ).
Household labour allocation decisions
Households in conflict-affected countries tend replace dead, injured or physically and mentally disabled adult workers with children, if these have not become fighters themselves, in order to compensate for the unexpected reduction in the financial resources available to households during wartime. The use of children as a form of economic security mechanism is widely reported in the development economics literature (see Dasgupta 1993, Nugent and Gillaspy 1983) , as is the resort to child labour as a form of compensating for low-incomes (Basu and Van 1998, Duryea, Lam and 9 Levinson 2007). In India, for example, agricultural households use seasonal school non-attendance by children and child labour as a form of self-insurance in the lean times (Jacoby and Skoufias 1997) . Similarly, in Indonesia, many households were forced to decrease their spending on education after the 1998 financial crisis (Thomas et al. 2004 ). These studies assume that households in general favour investing in the education of their children. However, when facing unexpected income shocks, households tend to trade-off future consumption with maintain current consumption (often food) levels. Income uncertainty may therefore adversely affect the quality and quantity of children"s education, and have severe negative consequences on the long-term welfare of households.
Children that are needed to replace labour may be removed from school, which may in turn deplete the household of their stock of human capital for future generations. They show that increased mortality risks, negative economic shocks and reduction in school quality due to violence are the main channels through which armed conflict reduces human capital investments at the household level and increases child labour.
The social legacy of the conflict becomes even more profound when we remember that data allows us to observe information only on those individuals who survive the conflict. In addition, poor individual health and the loss of family members may create serious restraints on access to schooling. In one such study, Evans and Miguel (2004) find that young children in rural Kenya are more likely to drop out of school after the parent"s death and that effect is particularly strong for children who lost their mothers.
Changes in returns to education
Violent conflict may affect considerably the level and distribution of returns to education across social groups and gender. Returns to education in turn play a large role in households" decisions.
Due to destruction of industries and infrastructure, job opportunities for skilled labour in conflictaffected countries generally become scarce. Households may respond to job scarcity by redistributing their resources away from investments with lower returns. In wartime contexts, this 10 may mean investing more in the education of boys rather than girls as boys may have a higher probability of finding better paid jobs. This effect is found in Shemyakina (2006) 
Targeting of schools, teachers, students and staff
In several conflict-affected countries, access to good quality education is seriously imperilled, not only due to the direct effects of fighting, but also because schools, teachers, students and staff are often targeted by violent attacks. The types of attack include the burning, shelling and bombing of schools, the occupation of schools by armed forces, the murder, torture, abduction and rape of teachers, students, education aid workers and school staff by armed groups or military forces, and the forced recruitment of child soldiers (O"Malley 2007 (O"Malley 2010 . These attacks lead to the death of teachers and students, the destruction of infrastructure, and result also in severe psychological trauma to those exposed to them. In face of repeated incidents and threats of attack, children are afraid to go to school, parents will be scared of sending them to school and teachers will be afraid to go to work. Schools will be closed to prevent attacks (IANS 2009), and governments may be reluctant to reopen schools because threats of attack may still be present (Mulkeen 2007 ). They will also find it difficult to replace teachers in the areas targeted (Mulkeen 2007) . Motives for these attacks on schools, students and staff vary according to circumstances. In some cases, schools are the only visible symbol of government rule, making them easy targets for rebel groups (O"Malley 2007) . Attacks are also used as a form of control of the population to impose religious, linguistic or 11 cultural identities (Human Rights Watch, 2006) , and to recruit personnel, or provide shelter for troops (O"Malley 2010) . Teachers are also perceived as leaders of communities. Threats and attacks to teachers tend to take place due to their opposition to the forced recruitment of children by armed groups, their positions of leadership in the community, and accusations they face by armed groups of collaborating with opposing groups (Novelli 2008 , Amnesty International 2007 . All these effects will have long term consequences for the type and quality of schooling available to children in areas of violence.
Displacement and forced migration
More than 27 million children are estimated to be out of education as a result of emergency situations. A large proportion of these are internally displaced (Mooney and French 2005) .
Displaced children are deprived of education but also of the support provided by educational structures in difficult, often persistently violent, environments. Access to education is an important element to the successful integration of internally displaced populations into their communities as the disruption to normal life and insecurity inherent in refugee and displacement camps can harm children"s physical, intellectual, psychological, cultural and social development with long term consequences to their welfare and that of their children (UNHCR 1994: 38-39) .
Education is increasingly viewed as the "fourth pillar" of humanitarian response, alongside nourishment, shelter and health services (Norwegian Refugee Council 1999 , ICWAC, 2000 .
Education can help to reduce children"s exposure to threats including sexual exploitation, physical attack and recruitment into armed groups. Classrooms can also be effective means to disseminate information on how to avoid landmines, reducing the risk of HIV/AIDS and other preventive measures. Access to education may also facilitate the integration of displaced populations into local communities as schools may provide a means to promote community cohesion.
Very often education is viewed as a long term post-conflict development aim and does not constitute a central element in emergency interventions amongst displaced populations. However, violent conflict and resulting displacement can last decades leaving whole generations without access to education and the social structures provided by schools and teachers. The availability of education in IDP camps is typically disorganised, when it exists at all. Where schools do exist they tend to be temporary, under-resourced, overcrowded and limited to primary education. Accessing schools outside the camps may not be an option due to issues of safety. The loss or confiscation of personal documents also makes enrolment difficult for displaced populations (Aguilar et al. 1998 ).
School fees, the cost of school supplies and travel costs may also pose constraints to the access of 
Conclusion
This paper provided a review of available empirical evidence on the impact of violent conflict, largely civil wars, on education outcomes amongst civilian and combatant populations affected by
violence. The literature reviewed shows a clear negative legacy of violent conflict on the educational outcomes of individuals and households exposed to violence. Three main themes emerge from existing empirical literature. The first is that even relatively minor shocks to a population"s level of education can cause significant and long-lasting detrimental effects on human capital formation. These effects persist well after the conflict has ended, with long-term intergenerational consequences in terms of school achievement, health outcomes and future earnings. Secondly, violent conflict seems to affect secondary schooling more critically than primary schooling (Swee 2009 , Shemyakina 2006 . This might indicate successful organisation of war schools at the primary level, and an indication that families and organisations try to give their children at the very least some primary education even in circumstances of persistent violence.
Thirdly, education effects are not gender neutral. Conflict can change social, economic and political relations in such a way that makes returns to schooling for some social groups (usually girls) less attractive (Shemyakina 2006, Chamarbagwala and Morán 2009) . Due to the destruction of industries and infrastructure, job opportunities for skilled labour, particularly women, may become scarce leading households to value the education of boys higher than that of girls. The vulnerability of girls to sexual attacks and abduction may also explain the lower educational attainment of girls observed during violent conflict.
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Evidence on the specific casual mechanisms that mediate these effects is scarce. The analysis of empirical studies and policy reports allowed us to review some important channels reported in the relevant literature, with important policy implications. These include the recruitment of child and youth soldiers, the need of children to contribute to household income, changes in returns to education during conflict, fear and attacks and displacement. Evidence on these channels, as well as the patterns emerging from recent empirical research, point to the importance of human capital accumulation for the wellbeing and economic outcomes amongst households and individuals affected by armed conflict and violence. We expect more to emerge as this area of research matures and we come to a better understanding of what specific factors are likely to affect education, who it is likely to be effected and the causal pathways through which these changes occur in order to help policy-makers to more effectively deal with the loss of education that violent conflict inflicts.
